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Real Property Survey
Ronald Benton Brown*
I. Introduction
This article is a survey of the decisions of the Florida Supreme
Court made between October 1, 1988, and September 30, 1989, which
directly concern the law of real property. They involve both issues of
private and public law, varying from disputes between buyers and sell-
ers to the scope of judicial review in a zoning case.
II. Attorney's Fees Under A Contract of Sale
A. Gibson v. Courtois'
A prospective buyer made an offer to purchase a home, but prior
to its acceptance, he revoked the offer and demanded the return of the
deposit which had been placed in escrow. When the escrow agent filed
an interpleader action to determine who should get the deposit, the
buyer prevailed and moved for the court to award him attorneys' fees
pursuant to a provision of the contract.2 The trial court refused, reason-
ing that there had never been a contract because the offer had been
revoked, and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed.3 The Flor-
ida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a party "is not obligated
under a contract provision to which he never assented."4
The purchaser argued that the seller should be estopped from de-
nying the effectiveness of the attorney's fees provision because he had
asserted that the entire contract was valid. The court found the princi-
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center.
1. 539 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1989). Justice Kogan wrote the opinion in which Justices
Ehrlich, McDonald, Shaw and Grimes concurred. Justice Barkett wrote a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Overton concurred.
2. The standard Florida Bar residential real estate contract provided: "Attorney's
Fees and Costs: In connection with any litigation arising out of this contract, the pre-
vailing parties shall be entitled to recover all costs incurred, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees." Gibson v. Courtois, 509 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 461.
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pie of estoppel to be "simply inapplicable in this situation."5 It rea-
soned that the argument could just as easily be applied against the
buyer who had recovered his deposit because he had successfully ar-
gued that no contract ever came into existence, i.e., that he should be
estopped from claiming the validity of the contract provision in the con-
tract he had argued was invalid.'
The Florida Supreme Court also held that the attorney's fees pro-
vision was not severable from the other provisions of the sales contract.
The seller had argued that the trial court had enforced the escrow pro-
visions of the contract and thus should also enforce the attorney's fees
provision. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the escrow
provisions of the contract had not been enforced and were, in fact, un-
enforceable. What the trial court had done was to order the return of
the deposit to avoid unjust enrichment.
Justice Barkett's dissent merely expresses agreement with an ear-
lier dissent written by Judge Schwartz in Leitman v. Boone.8 The point
is less than clear. The essence appears to be that the sellers, by relying
upon the contract in resisting the return of the deposit to the buyers
had subjected themselves to the attorney's fees provision of the con-
tract. Unfortunately, the dissent never makes it clear why that should
be so.9
B. Katz v. Van Der Noord0
In this case, the purchaser of a mobile home park had refused to
close after discovering that expenses would exceed the level that had
been warranted in the contract. The trial court had ordered the return
of the deposit and granted a new trial on damages. 1 After remand
from the district court, in which the new trial order was overturned, the
buyer moved for, and was awarded, attorney's fees based upon a provi-
5. Id. at 460.
6. Id. at 460-61.
7. Id. at 461.
8. 439 So. 2d 318, 323-25 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
9. Gibson, 539 So. 2d at 461 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
10. 546 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1989). Chief Justice Ehrlich and Justices Overton,
McDonald, Shaw, Grimes, and Kogan concurred in the per curiam opinion. Justice
Barkett concurred only in the result without writing an opinion.
11. Id. at 1048 (trial court entered judgment notwithstanding jury verdict for
buyer).
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sion in the contract. 12
The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the buyer could not
recover attorney's fees because he had elected to rescind the contract.
Rescission, it reasoned, extinguished the contract, so no relief could be
granted under one of its provisions.13 The supreme court rejected this
logic, stating,
We hold that when parties enter into a contract and litigation later
ensues over that contract, attorney's fees may be recovered under a
prevailing-party attorney's fee provision contained therein even
though the contract is rescinded or held to be unenforceable. The
legal fictions which accompany a judgment of rescission do not
change the fact that a contract did exist. It would be unjust to
preclude the prevailing party to the dispute over the contract which
led to its rescission from recovering the very attorney's fees which
were contemplated by that contract.14
The court explained that this decision was consistent with Gibson v.
Courtois,15 discussed above, which it distinguished because in that case
no contract had ever existed. In this case the contract had existed, but
it had been rescinded. The case was also remanded to determine if the
award of attorney's fees was barred by res judicata as used in an ear-
lier district court opinion denying damages including certain attorney's
fees. 6
It seems that the decision really turns on the nature of rescission,
and it is regrettable that the court did not elaborate on this point. This
case could have been used to distinguish between the judicial remedy of
rescission and the right of a party to a contract to cancel, or refuse to
perform, where the other party had committed a material breach. In
the former situation, by court order, the parties are returned to their
position status quo ante, while in the latter the nonbreaching party is
simply relieved of any further obligation to perform, leaving the con-
tract provisions, such as the attorney's fees provision, in effect.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1049.
15. Gibson, 539 -So. 2d at 459.
16. Katz, 546 So. 2d at 1050.
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III. Bonds Issues
In Partridge v. St. Lucie County, 7 the county sought the valida-
tion of special assessment bonds which were to be used to finance street
and drainage improvements within a municipal service benefit unit
(MSBU). The circuit court validated the bond issue after concluding
that the county had complied with all the requirements of the law.',
The appellants owned property within the MSBU. They sought to
intervene for the purposes of appealing the circuit court's decision.
Their point was that the improvements were not needed and that they,
and other property owners, could not afford the special assessments.
The supreme court concluded, however, that those were political ques-
tions to be decided by the County Commission. Precedent had estab-
lished that the court's role in the bond validation process is limited
solely to determining if the issuing body has the power to act and if
that body has exercised its power in accordance with the law. 9
IV. Contractor's Bonds
In American Casualty Co. v. Coastal Caisson Drill,20 the Second
District Court of Appeal certified the following question to the supreme
court: "May a subcontractor furnishing labor, services or equipment
worth over $200,000 on a public works project lawfully waive its rights
to the contractor's bond required pursuant to sections 255.05 and
337.18, Florida Statutes (1985)?"21 The supreme court decided that
the answer is no. 22
The contract contained an express waiver provision on the back,
even though on the front it provided that performance would be "in
accordance with all applicable DOT specifications, which included the
17. 539 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1989). Chief Justice Ehrlich and Justices Overton, Mc-
Donald, Shaw, Barkett, Grimes, and Kogan concurred in the unanimous per curiam
decision
18. FLA. STAT. ch. 75 and ch. 125, pt. I (1987).
19. Partridge, 539 So. 2d at 473 (relying upon DeSha v. City of Waldo, 444 So.
2d 16, 18 (Fla. 1984), which quoted Town of Medley v. State, 162 So. 2d 257, 259
(Fla. 1964)).
20. 542 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1989). Justice McDonald wrote the unanimous opinion.
Chief Justice Ehrlich and Justices Overton, Shaw, Barkett, Grimes, and Kogan con-
curred in the opinion.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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bond requirement. '23 When an unpaid subcontractor filed suit against
the contractor's surety, the trial court found this apparent conflict in
contract terms created an ambiguity in the contract, but the supreme
court found no such ambiguity. 24 It reiterated that it is the intention of
the parties which is controlling and that intent is to be deduced from
the language employed. The two terms were not necessarily inconsis-
tent because there was nothing in the term on the front which pre-
vented either party from waiving its rights to the bond, as was ex-
pressed by the provision on the back.25
The court stated that the statute has two purposes. The first is to
provide protection to subcontractors on public works because subcon-
tractors are deprived of their ordinary method of protection on private
construction, i.e., by obtaining a mechanic's lien.26 The second is to
protect the public from (a) the price increases, or at least variations,
which would result from subcontractors having to bear the risk of non-
payment, and (b) from the risk of delay caused by unpaid subcontrac-
tors' litigation. The public could lose this protection if the subcontrac-
tor was allowed to waive its rights against the bond in advance. Conse-
quently, the court concluded, there exists a legislative policy against
allowing waiver in advance by the subcontractor.
This policy against waiver was also evident in the statute itself.
The statute provided certain exemptions from the bond requirement,28
but also provided for unrestricted waiver. This was taken as evidence
that the legislature had not intended to allow waiver.29
In addition, the surety asked the court to consider the similarity
between the mechanics' lien statute and the payment bond statute be-
cause under the mechanics' lien statute a subcontractor is free to waive
its rights.30 The court accepted this invitation but decided that it would
lead to the opposite conclusion. The legislature had recently amended
23. Id.
24. Id. at 958.
25. American Casualty, 542 So. 2d at 958.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 958-59.
28. FLA. STAT. § 255.05(1)(a) (1987).
29. This is an example of the canon of statutory interpretation, "expressio unius
est exclusio alterious" (the expression of one excludes others). By expressing certain
exceptions from the bond, the legislature must not have intended any others, such as
waiver by the subcontractor.
30. American Casualty, 542 So. 2d at 958. FLA. STAT. § 713.20(2) (1987), pro-
vided that anyone but a laborer could waive a mechanics' lien at any time.
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the mechanics' lien statute to provide that a mechanics' lien could not
be waived in advance either." This subsequent action, the court con-
cluded, demonstrated a "legislative policy against waiver. "32
V. Eminent Domain
A. Palm Beach County v. Tessler3
The question certified by the Fourth District Court of Appeal was:
"Are the owners of commercial property located on a major public
roadway entitled to a judgment of inverse condemnation when the
county government blocks off any access to the property from the road-
way and leaves access thereto only through a circuitous alternative
route through residential streets? '34
The court first held that "there can be no doubt that where access
is entirely cut off, a taking has occurred, ' 35 because abutting owners
have easements of access, light and air from the street or highway
which is appurtenant to their land.36 However, in this case access was
not entirely cut off. The county, as part of road widening and bridge
construction had built a retaining wall directly in front of the plaintiff's
beauty salon, but the salon could be reached by "an indirect winding
route of some 600 yards through a primarily residential
neighborhood. '3 7
The court distinguished Division of Administration v. Capital
Plaza, Inc.,3 8 in which the impairment of traffic flow by installation of
a median in the road prevented northbound drivers from turning di-
rectly into the landowner's filling station. The court in that case held
that no taking had occurred. The court in Tessler pointed out that
Capital Plaza did not involve a deprivation of access, but only an im-
pairment of traffic flow, whereas Tessler involved a deprivation of
31. Fla. Laws Ch. 88-397.
32. American Casualty, 542 So. 2d at 958.
33. 538 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1989). Justice Grimes wrote the unanimous opinion.
Chief Justice Ehrlich and Justices Overton, McDonald, Shaw, Barkett, and Kogan con-
curred in the opinion.
34. Id. at 847.
35. Id. at 848.
36. Id (relying upon Benerofe v. State Road Dept., 217 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1969)
and Department of Transp. v. Jirik, 498 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1986)).
37. Id. at 847.
38. 397 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1981).
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access. 39
The court also discussed, approvingly, Pinellas County v. Austin,4 °
wherein the district court of appeal concluded that a landowner could
recover for the impairment of access caused when the county vacated a
road leading to the property. The landowner was allowed to recover
because he had suffered special damages, i.e., damages not common to
the general public. His damages could, however, be reduced by the
availability of another means of access, here an old wooden bridge
which could not support service vehicles such as garbage and fire
trucks.41
The court, in a footnote, acknowledged considering cases involving
a partial taking of land as well as the destruction of access, but consid-
ered that appropriate because both are compensable.4 s It then drew the
conclusion that "[t]here is a right to be compensated through inverse
condemnation when governmental action causes a substantial loss of
access to one's property even though there is no physical appropriation
of the property itself."'4 3 To recover, the access must be "substantially
diminished. 44 The damages recoverable are for the reduction in the
value of the property caused by the loss of access and the "extent of
access which remains after a taking is properly considered in determin-
ing the amount of compensation." 45 Furthermore, business damages are
available under the Florida statute.46
The court noted, while approving the decision of the district court,
that it had erred in holding that whether walling off the landowner's
property amounted to a substantial diminution rather than a mere in-
convenience was a question of fact. In inverse condemnation proceed-
ings, the judge is the fact finder and must resolve all conflicts in the
evidence. Then the judge must decide, as a matter of law, whether the
governmental activity has caused the landowner to suffer a substantial
39. Tessler, 538 So. 2d at 849.
40. 323 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
41. Id. In support of this proposition, the court cites to "City of Port St. Lucie v.
Parks, 452 So. 2d 1089, 1090-91 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.) ("Diminishment in quality
of access . . . means an actual impairment which results in some deprivation to the
property, but does not include mere inconvenience."), rev. denied, 459 So. 2d 1041
(Fla. 1984). Tessler, 538 So. 2d at 849.
42. Tessler, 538 So. 2d at 849.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. FLA. STAT. § 73.071 (1987).
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loss of access.
It is unfortunate that the court does not clarify whether it is dis-
cussing the provision in the Florida Constitution47 or the Taking Clause
in the United States Constitution.48 While it may seem obvious to the
court and to most readers that the court is referring to the Florida
Constitution, that referrence is not explicitly expressed anywhere in the
decision. The total lack of citation to any non-Florida case may help to
emphasize that it is the Florida Constitution being discussed.
B. Texaco v. Department of Transportation49
The Second District Court of Appeal certified the following ques-
tion as being of great public importance:
Is a lessee of property partially taken by eminent domain entitled
to business damages pursuant to section 73.071(3)(b), Florida
Statutes (1985), when the lessee is a wholesale supplier of products
to a sublessee who operates a retail business on the premises and
the lessee assists its sublessee in that retail business by, for exam-
ple, having constructed the building and other physical improve-
ments used by the retail business, allowing the business to be oper-
ated under the lessee's nationally recognized company name with
the lessee's sign and to use the lessee's credit card services, con-
ducting site inspections at the business to ensure compliance with
the lessee's standards, and paying the real estate taxes on the
property? 50
The court answered the question in the negative. 51
Texaco leased the property, constructed a service station and sub-
leased it to the station operator who operated a "Texaco" station in
accord with the requirements of the sublease. When the Department of
Transportation condemned a portion of the property, both the station
operator and Texaco claimed business damages under the statute. The
47. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. V, as incorporated into the Due Process Clause of U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. See Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
49. 537 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1989). Justice Overton wrote the unanimous opinion.
Chief Justice Ehrlich and Justices McDonald, Shaw, Barkett, Grimes, and Kogan con-
curred in his opinion.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 94-95.
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trial court held that Texaco had retained a sufficient interest in the
property to be entitled to the business damages, but the district court of
appeal reversed.52
Texaco asserted that business damages were constitutionally re-
quired by the court's decision in Meyers v. City of Daytona Beach,53
but the court decided that Meyers was not controlling because business
damages had not been addressed in that case. The court in Meyers held
only that, in a condemnation proceeding, a jury could not award a
property owner less than the lowest amount fixed by the evidence be-
cause that would not provide the "full compensation" required by the
Florida Constitution.54 The Texaco court held that business damages
are not required by either the Florida or United States Constitutions.
They are incidental and consequential damages which are allowed "as
a matter of legislative grace." 55
The court concluded that Texaco was not entitled to business dam-
ages under the statute because it did not meet one of the statutory
requirements. 56 The statute requires, inter alia, that a business physi-
cally exist on the property. The court found, under the facts, that Tex-
aco did not operate a business on the property. It did derive an income
from the sale of gasoline, there but it was merely a distributor-whole-
saler who sold to the operator who was in the business of selling to the
public at that location. The fact that Texaco did not have a license to
do business there supported that conclusion, as did the fact that, under
the lease, any business losses at that location would be suffered by the
operator.57
Texaco claimed that the District Court's interpretation of the stat-
ute would violate equal protection. That was disposed of summarily by
the supreme court which held, without analysis or citation to authority,
that the statute did not create "an unreasonable unconstitutional classi-
fication," 58 because to decide otherwise might open the door to a multi-
tude of claims by those situated similarly to Texaco.59
52. The award of business damages to the operator was not addressed by the
District Court of Appeal. Id. at 93 n..
53. 158 Fla. 859, 30 So. 2d 354 (1947).
54. Texaco, 537 So. 2d at 94.
55. Id. at 93.
56. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1985)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 94.
59. Texaco, 1537 So. 2d at 93-94.
1990]
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C. Conway Land, Inc. v. Terry60
This case also deals with eminent domain issues, and is discussed
infra in section XI (Rule Against Perpetuities).
VI. Homestead
In In re Estate of Scholtz,6' the Fourth District Court of Appeal
certified the following question to be of great public importance: "Is
the concept of abandonment as set out in Barlow v. Barlow still viable
in view of the 1985 amendment of the homestead provisions of the
Florida Constitution?"62 The supreme court concluded that the answer
is no.63
Prior to 1985, the Florida Constitution provided that certain prop-
erty owned by the head of a family would be homestead and would
therefore be exempt from attachment by creditors and would be subject
to limits on the owner's ability to devise it if he was survived by a
spouse or a minor child. 4 In Barlow v. Barlow,6 5 the court held that a
spouse who had abandoned the homestead would not be able to make a
claim against it under the latter provision after the other spouse died.
However, in 1985 the term "head of a family" was eliminated and re-
placed by the term "a natural person," leaving the question "whether
the concept of abandonment has survived the elimination of the head of
the family language .... ,6 In this case, the husband had purchased
the home after separating from his wife, titled it solely in his name
and, shortly before his death, moved to a nursing home. But the district
court decided that the husband's property was homestead. 67
This is not the typical abandonment case. Generally, it is the
abandoning spouse who is denied a homestead claim on the home he or
she has abandoned. Here, the abandoning spouse obtained a new home,
60. 542 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1989).
61. 543 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1989). Justice Grimes wrote the opinion in which Jus-
tices Shaw, Barkett, and Kogan concurred. Justice McDonald specially concurred in a
written opinion. Chief Justice Ehrlich filed a written dissent in which Justice Overton
concurred.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
65. 156 Fla. 458, 23 So. 2d 723 (1945).
66. Scholtz, 543 So. 2d at 220.
67. Id. at 219.
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and the court was determining if that home was homestead to which
the abandoned spouse has a valid claim.
The supreme court had already decided that the 1985 amendment
allowed homestead property to pass to adult heirs free from the claims
of creditors, even if the heirs were not dependent on the decedent.68
The court in that case had relied upon the plain language of the provi-
sion, the legislative history of the amendment, and the fact that home-
stead property had descended free of creditors' claims even before the
amendment. The crux of the decision was that, after the amendment,
more property would be considered homestead and, therefore, entitled
to this protection.6 9
Unlike the earlier case, the supreme court found no legislative his-
tory helpful in solving the question presented by this case. However, it
recognized that the concept of abandonment could be predicated upon
two bases. First, a spouse who abandons and sets up his own residence
elsewhere, having no intent of returning, could not be the head of a
household living in the abandoned premises. Consequently, the aban-
doning spouse could not be the head of the household residing there.70
Second, it would be inequitable for the spouse who has abandoned to
later claim the property as homestead when the other spouse dies. Both
of these are "related to the definition of homestead which contemplated
a 'head of the family.' "71 Since the head of the family concept had
been deleted from the homestead provision of the constitution, so
should the concept of abandonment of homestead.
Moreover, the language of the amendment is "clear and unambig-
uous. ' 72 The property is homestead if the decedent is survived by a
spouse or minor child. The decedent in this case died leaving a spouse,
so the property is homestead, and its descent is limited by the Florida
Constitution and determined by Florida statute.73
Justice McDonald's special concurrence is based upon his ex-
pressed preference that one must be the head of a household to pre-
clude a devise of real property because the policy behind that preferred
68. Public Health Trust v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1988). "The Court
pointed out that the cases relied upon by the creditors were ones in which it had been
decided that the owner was not the head of the family at the time of his death."
Scholtz, 543 So. 2d at 220.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 221.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Scholtz, 543 So. 2d at 221 (citing FLA. STAT. § 732.401(1) (1987)).
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requirement is different than the one behind the exemption from forced
sale and taxation. Consequently, he would have preferred the result as-
serted by Chief Justice Ehrlich's dissent, but agreed that the majority's
opinion is correct.74
Chief Justice Ehrlich asserts that the 1985 amendment eliminated
the "head of the household" language only for the first three sections
and retained it in section 4, which controls the limitation on ability to
devise the property. The purpose of section 4 was the protection of the
family in the event of the death of the head of the household. The
purpose of the 1985 amendment was to broaden the protection provided
by homestead under all four sections by expanding the possibilities that
property would be considered homestead. The majority's reading nar-
rows the family's protection under section 4.71
Moreover, under the majority's reading, the spouse who has aban-
doned would have the advantage of being able to claim homestead on
his or her own property and also benefit from the homestead status of
property owned by the abandoned spouse. Certainly, the Chief Justice
reasoned, it was not the purpose of the amendment to benefit an aban-
doning spouse by giving him or her two homesteads, because this would
encourage abandonment, clearly the antithesis of protecting the family,
which is the purpose behind homestead. 76
VII. Implied Warranty of Habitability
In Almand Construction v. Evans,77 the plaintiffs bought a new
home in 1972. It began to settle some time before 1978 and in that
year they notified the builder who attempted to repair the structural
damage in 1979. They did not learn the reason for the settling, that the
house was built on unsuitable fill, until 1982 when they received a re-
port from an engineer retained by their insurance company. This suit,
based upon the theories of negligence and breach of implied warranty,
was commenced in 1985. Consequently, the circuit court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendant on the theory that the action was
barred by the statute of limitations.718
74. Id. at 221-22 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 222 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. 547 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1989). Chief Justice Ehrlich wrote the unanimous opin-
ion. Justices Overton, McDonald, Shaw, Barkett, Grimes, and Kogan concurred in the
opinion.
78. Id. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (1977) provides a four year statute of limita-
[Vol. 14
Brown
The plaintiffs claimed that since they did not discover the cause of
the settling until 1982, the statute of limitations should not have begun
to run until 1982. However, in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiffs "offered no evidence [to demonstrate] circum-
stances which would toll the statute [of limitations,] and nothing in the
record supported that conclusion. ' '1 9
Furthermore, the court specifically stated, the "mere assertion that
the [plaintiffs] were not aware that unsuitable and defective fill was the
cause of the structural problems until 1982 was insufficient to create an
issue as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled." 80 The plain-
tiffs could not rely upon their lack of knowledge of the specific cause of
the damage to prevent their action from being barred by the statute of
limitations. As early as 1978, they knew that the house was settling
and that the settling was causing structural damage and this was "suffi-
cient to put them on notice that they had, or might have had, a cause
of action." 81 Consequently, the four year statute of limitations had run
long before they brought this action in 1985.
The court went on to state that the decision was consistent with its
decision in Kelley v. School Board of Seminole County82 which re-
jected the continuous treatment doctrine. Like Almand Construction,
Kelley involved a construction defect, although in that case the law suit
was against the architect. The defendant invoked the statute of limita-
tions even though he had been involved in attempts to correct the
problems.8 3 The district court had held that the statute of limitations
was tolled under the continuous treatment doctrine during that period
when the defendant continued to try to remedy the problem. 4 In
quashing the district court opinion, Justice McDonald pointed out that,
regardless of the lack of knowledge of the specific defect, the plaintiffs'
knowledge that something was wrong made the statute begin to run.
He quoted approvingly that "'people should exercise their rights within
tions for actions based, inter alia, upon "construction of an improvement to real prop-
erty, with the time running from the date of actual possession by the owner ... except
that when the action involves a latent defect, the time runs from the time the defect is
discovered or should have been discovered."
79. Almand Constr., 547 So. 2d at 628.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 435 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1983).
83. Id. at 805.
84. School Bd. of Seminole County v. GAF Corp., 413 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
1990]
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the limitations set and that this period should not be extended by good
faith attempts to remedy a defect.' "85 It is also interesting to note that
Justice Overton, who in his dissent in Kelley advocated accepting the
continuous treatment doctrine, 86  did not dissent in Almand
Construction.
VIII. Mechanics' Liens
A. Home Electric of Dade County, Inc. v. Gonas8"
This case involved the interpretation of Florida Statutes section
713.16(2) (1985), which provides:
At the time any payment is to be made by the owner . . . directly
to a lienor, the owner may in writing demand of any lienor a writ-
ten statement under oath of his account. . . . Failure or refusal to
furnish the statement within 30 days after demand or a false, or
fraudulent statement, shall deprive the person . . . of his lien.
A subcontractor had filed a claim of mechanics' lien and the
homeowner had made a demand for the written accounting under oath
as provided for in the above statute. The subcontractor failed to comply
by neglecting to providing the statement. So when the subcontractor
brought an action to foreclose the lien, the homeowner moved for sum-
mary judgment.88
The homeowner's demand had not, however, included any mention
that the statute would eliminate the lien if the accounting was not
made within thirty days. The First District Court of Appeal, in inter-
preting an earlier version of the statute, had held that the demand let-
ter must include such a notice.8 9 Relying upon this. precedent, the trial
court denied the homeowner's motion for summary judgment. The
Third District, however, reversed, 90 creating a conflict among the
85. Kelley, 435 So 2d at 806 (quoting K/F Dev. & Inv. Corp. v. Williamson
Crane & Dozer Corp., 367 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 378 So.
2d 350 (Fla. 1979)).
86. Id. at 807 (Overton, J., dissenting).
87. 547 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1989). Justice McDonald wrote the unanimous opinion.
Chief Justice Ehrlich and Justices Overton, Shaw, Barkett, Grimes, and Kogan con-
curred in the opinion.
88. Id. at 110.
89. Alex v. Randy, Inc., 305 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
90. Gonas v. Home Elec., Inc., 537 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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districts.
The supreme court pointed out that a mechanics' lien is a "statu-
tory creature"91 and, consequently, must be "'strictly construed in
every particular.' "92 This rule of construction had been ignored by the
First District when, by its liberal construction of the statute, it had
added its own notice requirement. 93 The supreme court held that the
statute does not expressly require that the demand include a notice of
the time limit and so no such notice is required for the demand to be
proper.94
B. The Florida Bar: In re Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Preparation
of Notice to Owner and Notice to Contractor95
The first step in perfecting a mechanics' lien, when a payment
bond has not been provided, is for the lienor to serve a Notice to
Owner.96 When a payment bond has been furnished, the first step of a
lienor not in privity with the owner is to furnish a Notice to Contrac-
tor.97 The current practice is for prospective lienors to have such no-
tices served by businesses, not lawyers, who do it as a profit-making
business. This led the Florida Bar Standing Committee on the Unli-
censed Practice of Law to consider the question: "Is it the unlicensed
practice of law for a nonlawyer to prepare the Notice To Owner re-
quired by Fla.Stat. § 713.06(2) and the Notice to Contractor required
by Fla.Stat. § 713.23(1)(d) ? ' 98
The committee conducted public hearings, and six representative
companies testified that they prepare from a few hundred to a few
thousand notices per month at an average cost of twenty-five dollars
each. Generally, the business takes the information-i.e., the lienor's
name, address, the services or materials being provided, the name of
91. Gonas, 547 So. 2d at 110.
92. Id. at 111 (quoting with approval Palmer Elec. Servs., Inc. v. Filler, 482 So.
2d 509, 510 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
93. Alex, 305 So. 2d at 14-15. Consequently, the court disapproved of Alex "to
the extent of conflict with this decision." Gonas, 547 So. 2d at 110-11.
94. Gonas, 547 So. 2d at I 11.
95. 544 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1989). This was an unanimous per curiam opinion.
Chief Justice Ehrlich and Justices Overton, McDonald, Shaw, Barkett, Grimes, and
Kogan concurred in the opinion.
96. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2) (1987).
97. FLA. STAT. § 713.23(1)(d) (1987).
98. Advisory Opinion, 544 So. 2d at 1013.
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the property owner and the location of the property--over the tele-
phone or from a filled out information sheet. The business then verifies
the information from the public records and sends the completed notice
by certified mail to the property owner and any other appropriate re-
cipient. If a lienor who wants to proceed to perfect or foreclose a
mechanics' lien, i.e., the lienor needs a Claim of Lien or a Notice of
Nonpayment, the lienor is told to consult an attorney. 9
The Bar committee concluded that the this was unlicensed prac-
tice of law, but that it was activity which was authorized so long as the
businesses used statutory or court-approved forms. 100 Therefore, "non-
lawyers may complete and serve the notices. The non-lawyers may not,
however, give legal advice, advise their customers in matters involving
the mechanics' lien statute, or complete any other forms required or
allowed by the mechanics' lien statute.''1 1
In considering the Bar's recommendation, the court acknowledged
that "'any attempt to formulate a lasting, all encompassing definition
of the "practice of law" is doomed to failure,' "1102 but it then relied
upon its definition from State v. Sperry:03
[Ilf the giving of such advice and performance of such services af-
fect important rights of a person under the law and if the reasona-
ble protection of the rights and property of those advised and
served requires that the person giving such advice possess legal skill
and a knowledge of the law greater than that possessed by the av-
erage citizen, then the giving of such advice and the performance
of such services by one for another as a course of conduct consti-
tute the practice of law.1 0 4
The service provided here is only the filling out, and mailing, of
two forms which are provided by statute. Filling out the forms requires
only a minimum of information and it is information which is easily
collected. Also, "substantial compliance with the statute will not defeat
99. Id. at 1014.
100. Id. at 1015 (relying on Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla.
1978)).
101. Id (quoting the Proposed Advisory Opinion at 19).
102. Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1978) (quoting
State Bar of Mich. v. Cramer, 399 Mich. 116, 122, 249 N.W. 2d 1, 7 (1976)).
103. 140 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962), vacated on other grounds, 373 U.S. 379
(1963).
104. Advisory Opinion, 544 So. 2d at 1016.
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a claim against a person who has not been adversely affected."' 105 The
supreme court concluded that "it is not the unlicensed practice of law
for nonlawyers to engage in communications with their customers for
the purpose of completing the [Notice to Owner] forms and prelimi-
nary notice forms as that activity is described in the Committee re-
port. °10 6 It did, however, "agree that the nonlawyer may give no legal
advice in connection with the preparation and service of the notices. '"101
It expressly limited its opinion to the two notices discussed. 10 8
IX. Mineral Interests
Conway v. Terry'09 deals with mineral interests, and is discussed
infra in section XI (Rule Against Perpetuities).
X. Mobile Homes
In Lanca Homeowners, Inc. v. Lantana Cascade of Palm Beach,
Ltd.," 0 the owner of a mobile home park sought declaratory judgment
when faced with the threat of rent withholding by mobile home owners
who claimed the owner had engaged in unfair practices. The homeown-
ers' association"' filed a counterclaim alleging violation of an earlier
consent judgment, violation of administrative rules and statutes, and
the imposition of unconscionable rent increases." 2 The trial court
found that the counterclaim was maintainable as a class action and
certified the homeowners' association as the appropriate class represen-
tative based upon Florida Statute § 723.079(1) (1985), which stated:
The association may institute, maintain, settle, or appeal actions or
hearings in its name on behalf of all home owners concerning mat-
ters of common interest . . . . If the association has the authority
to maintain a class action, the association may be joined in an ac-
105. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(d) (1987).
106. Advisory Opinion, 544 So. 2d at 1016.
107. Id. at 1016-17.
108. Id. at 1017.
109. 542 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1989).
110. 541 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1988). Justice Shaw wrote the unanimous opinion.
Chief Justice Ehrlich and Justices Overton, McDonald, Barkett, Grimes, and Kogan
concurred in the opinion.
111. Lanca Homeowners, a not-for-profit corporation, organized pursuant to
FLA. STAT. § 723.075 (1985).
112. Lanca Homeowners, 541 So. 2d at 1122.
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tion as representative of that class. . . involving matters for which
the association could bring a class action."'
A nearly identical condominium statute" 4 had been held unconsti-
tutional as a "legislative incursion into this court's exclusive rulemak-
ing authority." 1 5 The supreme court here similarly ruled that the sec-
tion involved was also procedural and thus within the exclusive
province of the court. Consequently, all but the first two sentences of
the statute were declared unconstitutional." 6
Following the logic of the earlier case, the court went on to recog-
nize the need for the rule and the soundness of the legislative formula-
tion. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.130(a), it
adopted the following procedural rule:
A mobile homeowners' association may institute, maintain, settle,
or appeal actions or hearings in its name on behalf of all home
owners concerning matters of common interest, including, but not
limited to: the common property; structural components of a build-
ing or other improvements; mechanical, electrical, and plumbing
elements serving the park property; and protests of ad valorem
taxes on commonly used facilities. If the association has the au-
thority to maintain a class action under this section, the association
may be joined in an action as representative of that class with ref-
erence to litigation and disputes involving matters for which the
association could bring a class action under this section. Nothing
herein limits any statutory or common-law right of any individual
home owner or class of home owners to bring any action which
may otherwise be available. An action under this rule shall not be
subject to the requirements of rule 1.220.117
Under the new rule, the homeowners' association could represent all
the mobile home owners in the class action.
The next question on appeal was whether the claim of an uncon-
scionable rent increase could be maintained as a class action. The stat-
ute"' provides a cause of action for an unconscionable rental agree-
113. Id. at 1022.
114. FLA. STAT. §§ 718.111(2) (Supp. 1976) & 711.12(2) (1975). "Only one
word differs." Lanca Homeowners, 541 So. 2d at 1123.
115. Avila South Condo. Ass'n v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).
116. Lanca Homeowners, 541 So. 2d at 1123.
117. Id. at 1123-24 (adopting Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.222).
118. FLA. STAT. § 723.033(2) (1985).
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ment or an unconscionable provision in an agreement. However, some
district court opinions have indicated that unconscionability claims
could not be litigated as class actions because the claims are too indi-
vidualized. The supreme court pointed out that the crux is whether the
rent increase was imposed across the board on all tenants after the ini-
tial lease by the park owner. This would put the mobile home owners in
a position where they had little meaningful choice. They must accept
the rent increase because selling or moving the mobile home from the
site would be so burdensome. "The 'absence of meaningful choice' for
these residents, who find the rent increased after their mobile homes
have become affixed to the land, serves to meet the class action require-
ment of procedural unconscionability." 1"9 The alleged unconscionability
of a rent increase "lends itself to proof in the class action format" 120
where the circumstance is equally shared by each mobile home owner.
And the Court points out that the court may create subclasses for any
class members who "may not occupy the same position."''
XI. Rule Against Perpetuities
In Conway v. Terry, 2' the City of Orlando had condemned prop-
erty in which the petitioners claimed to have a compensable interest.
They claimed to be the successors to an interest reserved by the grantor
to the respondents' predecessors in title. The language in the earlier
deeds stated the title was
SUBJECT HOWEVER, to the following:
2. That certain oil, mineral, and gas lease. . . the rental with
respect to which is on an annual basis of fifty cents (500) per acre
• ..except however, party of the first part does hereby specifically
reserve for the account, use and benefit of [Grantor], its successors
and assigns forever, one-half of any and all royalties that may be
paid or obtained from the lands . . . provided however, this reser-
vation shall not apply to participation in delay rental which may be
paid on account of any existing or any future oil, mineral and gas
119. Lanca Homeowners, 541 So. 2d at 1124.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1124.
122. 542 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1989). Justice Grimes wrote the opinion in which
Chief Justice Ehrlich and Justices Shaw, Barkett and Kogan concurred. Justice Mc-
Donald dissented in part and concurred in part in a written opinion with which Justice
Overton concurred.
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leases ... " 23
The questions before the Court were: 1) whether this language did
reserve an interest which could pass to a successor, 2) whether the in-
terest was an interest in realty entitling its owner to a share in the
condemnation award, and 3) whether that interest was void because it
violated the rule against perpetuities.""
The court pointed out that the use of the words "its successors and
assigns forever" are words used in creating a fee simple. This language
"flies in the face of the contention that the reservation was limited to
the existing lease. 1 25 The court might have more clearly explained this
by indicating that the use of these words of limitation traditionally in-
dicates that the parties intended to reserve an interest with the same
duration as a fee simple.
The court then pointed out that under prevailing oil and gas law,
the paragraph "expresses a clear intent to preserve a perpetual nonpar-
ticipating royalty interest. It is not an interest in the minerals in
place.' 26 The provision that delay rentals shall not be part of the res-
ervation reinforces the court's conclusion that the reservation is only in
the royalties received for minerals actually extracted.
The court then held that the interest in royalties in minerals which
were still in the ground was a realty interest. It distinguished Miller v.
Carr'2 7 which held that a royalty interest in minerals which had al-
ready been severed from the ground were personal property, not realty,
because the royalty interest would become personal property only when
the minerals were removed from the ground.128 Here, the minerals had
not been removed.
The final question was whether this perpetual royalty interest
would violate the rule against perpetuities. Kansas had adopted the rule
that a royalty interest is personal property and it does not vest until the
minerals are removed from the ground. 29 Consequently, a perpetual
royalty interest would violate the rule. However, only Kansas had ex-
pressly adopted such a rule. The Florida Supreme Court points out that
"the law favors an interpretation which provides for an early vesting of
123. Id. at 363.
124. Id. at 362-66.
125. Id. at 364.
126. Conway, 542 So. 2d at 364.
127. 137 Fla. 114, 118 So. 103 (1939).
128. Terry, 542 So. 2d at 364.
129. Cosgrove v. Young, 230 Kan. 705, 642 P.2d 75 (1982).
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estates."' 30 Following the leading case' 31 and the weight of authority
elsewhere, the court expressly held "that the reservation of the royalties
. . . does not violate the rule against perpetuities because it created a
presently vested interest in the land. The fact that production is uncer-
tain and may never occur does not defeat the interest."'1 2
This was the point upon which Justice McDonald disagreed. He
concluded that the grantors had retained no interest in the minerals or
in the land. The deeds specifically stated that they retained only an
interest in royalties, and where the property is under lease, as it was
here, "the term should be construed in a restricted sense of denoting an
interest in production."' 33 The grantors only had a right to share in the
monies derived when the minerals were removed. Consequently, their
interest would be merely a contingent interest in personal property. 34
It should be noted that Florida has now adopted the Uniform Stat-
utory Rule Against Perpetuities.'35 The analysis of this case would be
no different under the new Uniform Rule because both it and its prede-
cessor would apply to nonvested future interests. 36 However, it would
be far less likely that this case would ever have reached the court under
the new statute because the new statute (1) applies only to gratuitous
transfers, 37 and it is unlikely that the transfer here was gratuitous; (2)
includes a ninety year wait-and-see provision,' 38 and there is no indica-
tion here that the ninety years has expired; and (3) provides for the
court to reform a transfer according to the intent of the grantor in the
event that it appears that it will not vest in time.' 39
130. Terry, 542 So. 2d at 365.
131. Hanson v. Ware, 224 Ark. 430, 274 S.W. 2d 359 (1955).
132. Terry, 542 So. 2d at 365.
133. Id. at 366 (citing with approval Doss Oil Royalty, Co. v. Lahman, 302 P.2d
157, 166 (Okla. 1956)).
134. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
135. Fla. Laws ch. 88-40, see. 2 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 689.225).
136. FLA. STAT. § 689.225 (2) (Supp. 1988).
137. FLA. STAT. § 689.225(5)(a) (Supp. 1988) excludes nondonative transfers
from coverage of the statutory rule against perpetuities subject to certain exceptions,
e.g., transfers or settlements arrangements or transfers arising out of a marital relation-
ship or contracts to make or revoke a will.
138. FLA. STAT. §§ 689.225(2)(a)2., (b)2. & (c)2. (Supp. 1988).
139. FLA. STAT. § 689.225(4) (Supp. 1988).
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XII. Surface Water
In Westland Skating Center, Inc. v. Gus Machado Buick, Inc.,4
a skating center was built uphill from the Buick dealership. The new
building caused a significant increase in the surface water running onto
the rear of the dealership property, and, following a rainstorm, exten-
sive flooding damaged several cars. When negotiations failed to pro-
duce a solution to the problem, the dealership built a wall to act as a
barrier against the runoff. It worked, causing flooding of the uphill
Skating Center in the next heavy rains. The Skating Center responded
by having its employees sledge-hammer holes in the wall. This litiga-
tion followed.'
The court reviewed the doctrines which have been used to govern
surface water, i.e., the common enemy rule, the civil law rule and the
reasonable use rule. It then reviewed the Florida cases on the subject,
concluding "[t]he Florida position with respect to the interference with
surface waters is not entirely clear."'' 42 It concluded its analysis by de-
ciding "we have elected to adopt the reasonable use rule in cases in-
volving the interference with surface waters."'14 It clarified the rule by
quoting,
Although the courts have treated the doctrine of reasonable use as
a separate rule on equal footing with the civil law and common
enemy rules, it is in reality merely the general tort principle which
would decide such cases in the absence of the application of either
of the two "property" rules. The relationship between adjoining
landowners, in the absence of specific property rights, has always
been governed by the maxim, "Sic utere two [sic] ut alienum non
laedas" ("Use your property in such a manner as not to injure that
of another.") 4
The court appears to limit this decision by stating that "[t]he prin-
ciple that an upper landowner enjoys an easement across the lower
tract for all naturally occurring surface water continues to apply to
140. 542 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1989). Justice Grimes wrote the unanimous opinion.
Chief Justice Ehrlich and Justices Overton, McDonald, Shaw, Barkett, and Kogan con-
curred in the opinion.
141. Westland Skating, 542 So. 2d at 959.
142. Id. at 961.
143. Id. at 962.
144. Id. at 962-63 (quoting F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER, R. AUSNESS, & B. CANTOR,
FLORIDA WATER LAW 596 (1980)).
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land in its natural state." '145 This is a statement of the civil law rule.
Therefore, it appears that two rules are now in effect in Florida. But
the court also states that when the land, upper or lower, has been im-
proved, the reasonable use rule governs. 146 It is hard to imagine under
what circumstances the civil law would be applied if any activity is to
be judged by the reasonableness standard. This ambiguity in the opin-
ion may, unfortunately, produce some confusion and wasteful litigation.
The court went on to rule that compliance with the building code
would not be determinative on the issue of reasonableness. Compliance
with the building code would be evidence of reasonableness, but other
relevant evidence should also be considered. The court pointed out that
the "persuasiveness of . . .compliance with the code may depend, in
part, upon the extent to which the code seeks to protect others from
being damaged by surface waters caused through the construction of
the approved project.' '1 47
XIII. Zoning
In Education Development Center v. City of West Palm Beach
Zoning Board of Appeals, 48 the owner of land which was zoned resi-
dential petitioned the zoning board to allow it to convert its residential
property into a private preschool and kindergarten. The petition was
denied, and the landowner appealed to the circuit court which reversed.
However, the district court of appeal reversed because the trial court
had applied the wrong standard. On remand, the circuit court again
reversed the board's decision, holding that the board's decision was not
based upon substantial competent evidence.' 49 The Fourth District dis-
agreed, concluding that the board's decision was supported by substan-
145. Id. at 963.
146. Westland Skating, 542 So. 2d at 963. "The [reasonable use] rule applies
not only in cases involving the conduct of the upper owner but also to improvements by
the lower owner, such as the construction of dams designed to protect against the natu-
ral flow of surface waters across the lower land." Id.
147. Id. at 964 n.7.
148. 541 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1989). Justice Barkett wrote the opinion in which
Chief Justice Ehrlich and Justices Overton, Shaw, Grimes, and Kogan concurred. Jus-
tice McDonald filed a written dissent.
149. Id. Note that in this opinion the terms "substantial competent evidence"
and "competent substantial evidence" are used as if they are synonyms. The author has
been unable to find any indication that they are not, but clarifying the point may be of
interest to the court or some scholar.
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tial competent evidence. 150 The Florida Supreme Court quashed that
decision of the district court.
The supreme court pointed out that a circuit court's certiorari re-
view of administrative agency action should consist of three
considerations:
(1) whether procedural due process was provided;
(2) whether the essential requirements of the law were observed; and
(3) whether the agency's findings and judgment are supported by com-
petent substantial evidence. 15'
However, the scope of subsequent review of the circuit court's opinion
by the district court of appeal is narrower. The district court is limited
to only two considerations: 52
(1) "whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process," and
(2) whether the circuit court "applied the correct law.' 53
There had been no contention that the circuit court had violated the
requirements of due process, and there was no finding by the district
court that the trial judge did not use the correct law. Therefore, the
supreme court concluded, to reverse on other grounds would be to ex-
ceed the proper scope of review.' This case clearly establishes the pro-
position that the district court of appeal, when reviewing by certiorari
the decision of a circuit court which reviews agency action, may not re-
examine the question of whether the agency's decision was based upon
substantial competent evidence.
Justice McDonald's dissent interpreted the district court decision
as the "equivalent to the appellate court's determination that in assess-
ing the facts the trial judge failed to apply the right law." '155 "There
was ample evidence for the board to reach its conclusion. When the
trial judge declared to the contrary, he was not following the appropri-
ate law in assessing factual matters.' 1 56 Justice McDonald protested
that the trial judge's use of the "magic words," i.e., "'there was no
substantial competent evidence,' ,,15 should not insulate the decision
150. City of West Palm Beach Zoning Bd. of Apps. v. Education Dev. Center,
Inc., 526 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
151. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(3).
152. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(2)(B).
153. Education Dev. Center, 541 So. 2d at 108 (quoting City of Deerfield Beach
v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982)).
154. Id. at 108-09.
155. Id. at 109 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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from review by the district court of appeal on the question of whether
the trial court had correctly applied the correct law because that would
make the trial judges "absolute czars in zoning matters. 158
XIV. Conclusions and Observations
The cases surveyed here are a small sample of the work of the
Florida Supreme Court. However, certain points are worth noting. Of
the fourteen real property related cases decided during the period ex-
amined, nine were unanimous decisions. Of the five split decisions, none
were close votes-the majority always had at least five of the seven
votes. This level of agreement by the justices is remarkable.
Further, the writing chores were evenly shared by the Justices.
Justices Overton, Shaw, Kogan, and Barkett and Chief Justice Ehrlich
each wrote one property-related opinion. Justice McDonald wrote two,
and Justice Grimes wrote four. Three opinions were per curiam. From
this slight sampling, it does not appear that any pattern of dominance
in the real property area has emerged.
Also, there was nothing surprising or daring about any of these
decisions. The emphasis was on the practical, rather than theoretical,
aspects of the law. The only case which really changes the law is West-
land Skating Center, Inc. v. Gus Machado Buick, Inc,159 and it merely
follows a trend established elsewhere. All the others continue the pro-
cess of reiterating established rules and elaborating upon their
application.
-158. Education Dev. Center, 541 So. 2d at 109.
159. 542 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1989) (concerning the right to get rid of surface
water). This case is discussed infra, notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
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